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being considered in depth in a 
single, discrete chapter. This robs 




depth to the 
analysis, while 
simultaneously 
adding value to 
our understanding 
of small unit 
leadership and 
cohesion
Second, the title of the book 
refers to ‘British Army’ cohesion, 
deviancy and murder. That title 
is misleading. This is not a study 
of the British Army in Northern 
Ireland, but of three battalions 
during a single, short phase of that 
conflict. The deviancy and murder 
on offer refer to two very specific 
incidents, namely the killing of 
Naan and Murray by soldiers of 
the Argylls, and the behaviour of 
the same unit following the death 
of Edmund Woolsey, a Catholic, 
in an explosion in South Armagh 
the same year, and in which 
Argyll soldiers were accused 
of retrieving Woolsey’s body 
parts for use as trophies. Yet at 
the same time, Burke is clear in 
drawing a distinction between 
these sorts of actions and those 
of other army units in the same 
area of operations during the 
same period. He mentions the 
Welsh battalion which caused 
near panic in Republican circles 
with its ‘friendly and restrained’ 
approach, for example, and 
of the ‘Gentlemen’ units who 
preferred a less combative form 
of interaction with the locals. And 
the study supports and references 
the argument advanced by 
Stathis Kalyvas, namely that 
the British Army’s campaign in 
Northern Ireland was, compared 
with other counterinsurgency 
campaigns before and since, 
remarkably restrained in the 
application of lethal violence. 
With this in mind, one cannot 
help but feel that the title does not 
accurately portray either the tone 
of the book or, indeed, the tone 
of the conflict as a whole. But it 
does not detract from the fact 
that this is still a very, very good 
book. In An Army of Tribes, Burke 
has produced a piece of work 
on the Northern Ireland conflict 
unlike any other. The range of 
face to face interviews with those 
actively engaged on both sides of 
the Troubles in Belfast and South 
Armagh during the height of the 
conflict provides real depth to 
the analysis, while simultaneously 
adding value to our understanding 
of small unit leadership and 
cohesion. n
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This authoritative book, written by veteran journalist and military 
analyst Paul Moorcraft, charts the 
series of protracted wars which 
erupted across southern Africa 
between the 1960s and the 1990s. 
Here, decolonisation, militant 
national liberation movements 
and white-minority resistance 
interacted with the wider Cold 
War environment to deadly effect. 
Moorcraft’s lengthy study provides 
a comprehensive overview of 
civilian-military relations and 
security structures (and their 
flaws) in the colonial Portuguese 
state, and white-minority states 
of Rhodesia and South Africa. 
Based on Moorcraft’s extensive 
personal knowledge and close 
study of the region over the past 
40 years, Total Onslaught: War 
and Revolution in Southern Africa 
Since 1945 is part grand narrative 
and part personal recollection, as 
he interviewed a large number of 
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the protagonists and participants 
in these long conflicts. 
The structure of the book 
follows a broad chronology, 
focusing on earlier conditioning 
conflicts (in terms of the 
development of South Africa’s 
military capacity), on the wars 
of liberation and white-minority 
resistance, and on post-1994 
turbulence. Using the lens of 
military engagements and their 
varied outcomes – together 
with the impact on the evolution 
of military forces and the 
civilian-military nexus as played 
out in neighbouring states – the 
book briefly charts white colonial 
settlement of South Africa, and 
the rise of the Afrikaner minority 
state; British decolonisation 
in sub-Saharan Africa; and 
white-minority resistance to the 
‘Wind of Change’. 
Moorcraft is at his strongest 
when considering the period 
following Rhodesia’s unilateral 
declaration of independence 
and the South African state in 
the apartheid era. He explores 
Rhodesia’s counterinsurgency 
in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
and delves into the regional 
and international implications 
of South Africa’s determined 
destabilisation of its neighbours 
in the 1980s. Even those who are 
well versed in the region’s recent 
turbulent history will learn a 
considerable amount about the 
brutal civil war in Mozambique, 
Namibia’s often overlooked 
struggle for independence, post-
independence Zimbabwe, and 
the complexities of the National 
Security Management System in 
South Africa. 
The main focus of this long 
book is the militarisation of 
ideological–political attempts 
to maintain white minority 
rule against mounting odds and 
multiple pressures. As the regional 
hegemon, South Africa gets 
the lion’s share of Moorcraft’s 
robust analysis. Broad lessons for 
counterinsurgency (both in theory 
and practice) are firmly embedded 
in the text, although Moorcraft is 
careful to emphasise the unique 
aspects of each state: political 
leadership and organisation; social 
and ethnic divisions; economic 
and commercial structures; labour 
organisation; and individual 
and often competing liberation 
movements. He makes many 
astute observations and has a wry 
turn of phrase which make this 
book a very accessible read: white 
rule in Rhodesia and South Africa 
is characterised as ‘a condition, a 
disease’; ‘whites, like their black 
successors, were slow learners’; 
he contrasts the stick of South 
African security oppression with 
the ‘withered carrot of reform’. 
Moorcraft draws a clear picture 
of the destructive and long-lasting 
legacies of ‘struggle’ across the 
region, which have left success 
or states with multiple complex 
challenges, and often profoundly 
eroded or compromised 
institutions. His trenchant 
conclusion is that ‘appalling 
governance has emasculated the 
continent’. It is hard to argue with 
this judgement. 
The book’s dominant theme 
is the danger of obsession 
with successful operational 
techniques which created ‘a fatal 
blindness to the strategic political 
imperatives required to counter 
protracted insurgency’. All three 
white-minority governments 
struggled against African 
participation in national politics 
– and correspondingly resisted 
‘the war winner’ of far-reaching 
reform. Moorcraft underlines 
the diverse and enduring 
complexities of Africa’s conflicts, 
which are domestic, regional and 
international, thus proving such 
a challenge for the promoters of 
peace and conflict resolution. His 
analysis of strategies of conflict 
and military hardpower includes 
consideration of each side’s 
strengths and weaknesses, with 
the emphasis primarily on the 
‘white minority state’ rather than 
liberation movements themselves. 
Moorcraft points to the legacies 
of political cultures and military 
institutions of national liberation 
movements in contemporary 
southern African states. In each 
case there was, and still is, a 
particular fusion of political and 
military elite, the sustaining power 
of ideas and simplicity of purpose, 
masking the many fractures within 
and between the nationalist 
movements.
Overall this is a book for the 
generalist, rather than specialist; 
on many occasions and in lengthy 
passages of the book, Moorcraft 
has not revealed his sources. The 
selected bibliography is limited 
– there is no reference, for 
example, to John P Cann’s work 
Counterinsurgency in Africa: The 
Portuguese Way of War 1961–1974 
or Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses’s and 
Robert McNamara’s exploration 
of Operation Alcora (the strategic 
‘unholy alliance’ between South 
Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia). 
When exploring South African 
motivations behind the invasion of 
Angola in 1975, Odd Arne Westad’s 
The Global Cold War (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) and Jamie 
Miller’s An African Volk: The 
Apartheid Regime and its Search 
for Survival (Oxford University 
Press, 2016) are required reading. 
Similarly, Piero Gleijeses’s Visions 
of Freedom: Havana, Washington, 
Pretoria, and the Struggle for 
Southern Africa, 1976–1991 
(University of North Carolina 
Press, 2013), on South Africa, 
Soviet and Cuban involvement in 
the Angolan theatre, is a key work. 
There are surprising omissions 
from the rich field of studies on 
post-independence Zimbabwe 
(Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni) and 
the end of the apartheid era (for 
example, Adrian Guelke, Jack 
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Spence, David Welsh, Charles 
Feinstein and Chris Saunders). 
This book sits firmly in the 
field of security studies. For 
the specialist in international 
history, it contains a number of 
irritating errors, exaggerations 
and omissions. As a few examples: 
there is no discussion of 
non-alignment in this book; it 
is hard to characterise Britain’s 
departure from Kenya as ‘relatively 
graceful’, given what we now know 
of the repressive colonial state 
during the Mau Mau emergency 
(see Caroline Elkins’ and David 
Anderson’s work); South Africa 
left the Commonwealth in 1961 
because it was determined to 
become a republic, and was 
made to realise if the country 
reapplied for membership, it 
would be barred. Moorcraft cites 
no sources on the manipulation of 
international gold sales. Rhodesia 
did not return to formal British rule 
until December 1979, not 1980. 
Nor did ‘a second version of the 
Cold War phoenix under Putin’; 
the Soviets were not ‘tactless 
colonisers’, nor did they seek 
‘real estate’ (see Irina Filatova and 
Apollon Davidson, The Hidden 
Hand: Russia and South Africa 
in the Soviet Era, 2013). President 
Carter had already shifted towards 
‘big budget’ war against the Soviet 
bloc before President Reagan’s 
arrival at the White House. 
There is a somewhat simplistic 
presentation of the negotiated 
withdrawal of Cuban troops and 
personnel, Soviet military advisers 
and the SADF from Angola (see 
Anatoly Adamishin, The White 
Sun of Angola, English translation, 
Wilson Center, 2014), as well as 
Gleijeses’s detailed exploration 
of the role of Cuban military 
advantage in Southern Angola, in 
Visions of Freedom). However, 
Moorcraft is certainly correct 
that the hard power of the South 
African state did not crack, and 
South African Foreign Minister Pik 
Botha personally confirmed to me 
the existence of American fears, 
behind their encouragement to 
South Africa to decommission the 
homegrown nuclear programme, 
namely that a radical nationalist 
ANC government might pass 
nuclear secrets to Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi. (Those 
interested in this topic should 
read South African scholars Anna-
Mart Van Wyk’s and Jo-Ansie Van 
Wyk’s groundbreaking work.)
Notwithstanding the author’s 
sometimes over-fondness 
for a colourful or glib phrase, 
he presents a sustained and 
powerful argument of creeping 
militarisation in the process of 
policy formulation, and underlines 
inconsistencies and contradictions 
of policy implementation – across 
southern Africa and beyond. 
There are many warnings from 
history in this book, most of all, on 
the danger of attempts at military 
solutions to political problems. 
As Moorcraft shows very clearly, 
relative military success and hard 
power advantage can militate 
against far-sighted political 
strategy and vision. Those who 
seek to use hard power to resolve 
political challenges should take 
note. n
Sue Onslow is Deputy Director 
and Reader in Commonwealth 
History at the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies. She has 
published widely on southern 
Africa in the Cold War era. 
DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2018.1562047
Bolts from the Blue: 
From Cold War 
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A ir Chief Marshal Sir Richard Johns originally intended his book Bolts 
from the Blue: From Cold War 
Warrior to Chief of the Air 
Staff to be an autobiography 
for his grandchildren. In this, it 
succeeds magnificently. Thirty 
years and 250 pages cover 
a career of varied and exciting 
flying as an officer in the 
RAF: from his early training at 
Cranwell; to close-quarters 
combat training at night in 
Javelins; to supersonic Hunters 
doing fighter reconnaissance 
in the deserts of the Arabian 
Peninsula; and then to flying and 
commanding the most challenging 
of airframes, the vertical take-off 
Harrier. The book also reveals the 
background to these events – a 
rich tapestry of travel to different 
postings, around every two 
years or less. The book is hugely 
illuminating for those outside the 
air force profession.
